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This paper investigates the Chinese mainland Stock Exchanges 
and their following interconnecting features: savers’ attitude 
towards stock investments, investors’ trading behaviour and 
stock returns explanations. We evaluate the effectiveness of the 
recent efforts made by the Chinese authorities to improve the 
level of legal protections for shareholders and the opening-up of 
the Chinese Stock Markets to foreign investors. The whole 
analysis is carried out through a system of simultaneous 
equations. The main results are that Chinese shareholders and 
stock markets are mostly driven by emotional behaviour. Stock 
market returns are barely influenced by the overall Chinese 
economic booming, but reveal the presence of speculative 
influences. Investors’ behaviour, as well as general trading 
activities, hardly seems to be affected by the legal framework 
introduced by the national Authorities. 
 
Field of research: Chinese Stock Exchanges, shareholders’ rights, corporate 
governance, investors’ behaviour, system of simultaneous equations. 
 
JEL: C30, F30, G18 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This article aims to describe the interconnecting features of the Chinese Stock 
Exchanges using a systematic approach. The various characteristics of a stock 
market interact with each other, giving rise to a series of complex relationships. It 
has been shown that the increase in the number of stock investment accounts may 
depend upon the level of the stock market returns, as well as the level of trust that 
savers place upon share investment (La Porta et al., 2002). At the same time, this 
“trust” also influences stock trading volumes, which are clearly affected by the 
evolution of stock investment accounts. 
 
_________________________ 
*Corresponding author. Department of Economics, Università Politecnica delle Marche, piazzale 
Martelli 8, 60121, Ancona, Italy.  c.lucarelli@univpm.it. 
**Department of Economics, Università Politecnica delle Marche. g.palomba@univpm.it. 
 
 
 
 
Lucarelli & Palomba 
 
65
 
These simple examples point to the complexities that we have to deal with when 
drawing up such a unique market scenario such as that for the Chinese Stock 
Exchanges. In fact, as far as the mainland stock markets are concerned, we have 
to consider two different Stock Exchanges, the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
(hereafter SHSE) and the Shenghen Stock Exchange (hereafter SZSE), as well as 
two sub-set of shares, A-shares and B-shares. 
 
The A-share markets have traditionally been available for Chinese savers only, and 
the access of foreigners only allowed under the strict control of the Chinese 
Authorities, according to the “Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor-QFII” formula 
of 2002. The B-share markets, on the other hand, are specific for foreigner 
investments, even if they have been open to the Chinese citizens since the 
beginning of 2001. Moreover, since 1999, the Chinese Authorities have been 
promoting a reshaping of the national stock market regulatory framework, involving 
considerable changes that would improve the savers legal rights system and widen 
the number of shareholders in favour of foreign investors (CSRC, 2003, 2004 and 
2005). 
 
The chinese stock markets provide good investor opportunities due to the large 
number of potential investors and to the fast increase of per capita income as seen 
over the last few years. The average growth rate for wages is above 13% and the 
saving rate is at almost 40% (Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China). The 
overall positive attitude of the Chinese towards stock investments should also to be 
taken into consideration, despite the historical “ideological bias” related to the fact 
that, until November 2002 (and the 16th Chinese Communist Party Congress), any 
income from holding stocks would not have been approved. Given the abundance 
of savings, stock investments may also be stimulated by the lack of the 
attractiveness of alternative investment opportunities, such as bonds, real estate or 
bank deposits. Even if bond investments remain attractive to Chinese savers, other 
more remunerative opportunities for investments may still arise. In fact, since 2000, 
many Chinese households have intensified the level of their investment in both 
residential buildings and economical housing; although recent indications suggest 
that they may be afraid of a speculative real estate bubble. Regarding bank 
deposits, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) sources reveal that the percentage 
rate of Household Savings Deposits grew from 7% in 2000 to 16% in 2002. Even if 
wages and saving rates are still steadily increasing, the upward trend of this rate 
surprisingly turned upside down in 2004, dropping to 9%. Hence, we may argue 
that those savings are (or may be “emotionally”) attractive for stock investments 
opportunities. 
 
Furthermore, the free-floating of Chinese shares is very low compared to Western 
standards (on average 30% of the total shares issued). A full two-thirds of the 
Chinese stock market capitalisation is still tied up in non tradable or “legal person” 
shares held by state controlled entities(1). This is due to historical and political 
reasons of the Chinese stock markets’ growth that were related to the partial sell-
off of the State Owned Enterprise (SOEs) capital shares. In fact, the Initial Public 
Offers (IPOs) and raising funds operations are under strict political control (Chen, 
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2003). This may explain the strong divergence between the Chinese GDP 
development and the stock index performances. In fact, until 2001, as the GDP 
grew, the stock markets’ trends were positive, while as it decreased, their trends 
were bearish (see Figure 1). This positive relationship is traditionally expected, as 
a general phenomenon of a virtuous interrelationship between financial and 
economic development(2). 
 
As a consequence, the more an economy grows, the more the listed companies, 
which should have contributed to such growth, would increase their market value. 
On the contrary, starting from 2002, the stock markets indexes have shrunk, 
although the Chinese GDP has maintained a steady growth. This may be related to 
the fact that the major part of the stock markets (almost 80%) refers to big and not 
particularly efficient SOEs, that have been listed by the Chinese government in 
order to settle financial troubles (Chen, 2003). We could argue that the companies 
responsible for the Chinese development are unlikely to be listed in the Chinese 
stock markets. 
 
Figure 1: Chinese Stock Exchanges vs. Chinese GDP - percentage changes 
 
 
Source: DATASTREAM 
 
An important remark is that since 2001, the Chinese Authorities have been 
promoting the reshaping of the national stock market regulatory framework, with 
considerable efforts for both improving the saver legal rights system and widening 
the shareholders’ base in favour of foreign investors. 
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Specifically, we model the Chinese market dynamics with a system of 
simultaneous equations in order to identify and quantify the level of influence that 
interacting features have upon the following variables: 
• investors’ number in terms of stock investment accounts in both the SHSE 
and the SZSE markets; 
• trading volumes, in terms of deals concluded, in both the SHSE and the 
SZSE markets; 
• stock market returns, which represent the performances of the Shanghai 
and the Shenghen stock indexes. 
Moreover, we insert different dummy variables, representing the regulatory 
interventions enforced in the Chinese Stock Exchanges, in order to test whether 
these efforts have really been effective in improving and developing the national 
stock markets. This paper is organized as follows: section 2 consists of a short 
review of the literature concerning shareholder rights protection system and the 
main features of the Chinese stock markets, while in Section 3 we carry out the 
empirical analysis to model the relationship mentioned above. Section 4 
summarizes the main results provided by the model estimation and section 5 
concludes.  
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The protection of shareholder rights is generally related to a system of corporate 
governance of a country. Literature has focused on how the legal framework 
influences the financial development of a country, and it has been asserted that it 
is important to fully understand the patterns of financial development for different 
countries(3). 
 
According to La Porta et al. (2000), corporate governance can be considered as “a 
set of mechanisms through which outside investors protect themselves against 
expropriation by the insiders”. But Chinese corporate governance, in practice, is 
very different from this view; the Chinese corporate governance reform, started 
with the Company Law of 1994, was designed to primarily address problems within 
the State sector and, in particular, to reform traditional State-owned enterprises 
and their inefficiencies. The key issue relies upon the State policy of maintaining a 
full or controlling ownership interest in enterprises with different sectors (Clarke, 
2003). To reach a paradox, it could mean that Chinese corporate governance is a 
set of mechanisms through which the main inside investor (the State) protects itself 
against expropriation by outsiders. Thus, with such a weak corporate governance 
system, such strong implicit contracts and the insecurity of property rights, as 
characterised by the Chinese legal framework of the 90s and the beginning of the 
00s (4), the whole and effective fulfilment of a shareholders’ legal protection system 
has not yet been achieved. The literature does confirm the limited protection of 
minority rights in Asia that allows controlling shareholders to expropriate minority 
shareholders (Claessens and Fan, 2002). 
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However, the Chinese Authorities are aware of the urgency for improving the legal 
system for savers’ rights and for widening the shareholders’ base, especially in 
order to foster the opening up of the financial system (and Stock Exchanges) to 
foreign investors. Indeed, specific rules for corporate governance for listed 
companies have been systematically issued since 1999 (more than 300 regulatory 
acts)(5).All this regulatory activity explains the purpose of our article that is to check 
whether this new set of rules has been significantly affecting shareholders’ 
behaviour. 
 
 
3. Methodology  
 
The dataset used in this approach is given by a sample of 93 monthly observations 
taken from a period that goes from January 1999 to September 2006. The source 
for data is the Thompson DataStream archives. Table 1 shows a detailed list of all 
available variables and the corresponding derived variables that enter the model. 
The SHSE and the SZSE are simply named as market 1 and market 2, while A and 
B indicate the A-shares and B-shares respectively. The derived series are obtained 
by using 100 times the log difference transformation. This was used for two 
reasons: firstly, this is a useful approximation of the percentage variations of time 
series, and secondly, it avoids any problems due to the presence of nonstationary 
variables. For example, we express the shares returns at time t as 
rij,t=100·[ln(Pij,t)−ln(Pij,t−1)], where i = A,B (shares),  j = 1, 2 (markets) and Pij,t is the 
share price at time t. The variance time series are obtained by exploiting the daily 
data for A and B-share returns via the equation 
     ∑
=
−= k
T
t
ijktijk
k
ijt RRT 1
2
, ,)(
1σ      (1) 
where Tk is the sample size at month k, Rijk,t is the daily return at time t, and ijkR is 
the average return for the share i and the market j in the k-th month. 
 
Moreover, all the endogenous variables in Table 1 were previously filtered in order 
to avoid seasonality; the main assumption here is that all the seasonal patterns can 
be modelled using deterministic seasonal dummies, thus time series that enter the 
model are obtained as residuals of OLS estimation. Table 2 contains the complete 
list of the regulatory dummies considered in our analysis. 
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Table 1: Variable description 
 
 
Series Description Derived series 
Endogenous variables 
yA1 A-share investors' number – Shanghai iA1 = 100·[ln yA1 - ln yA1(-1)] 
yA2 A-share investors' number – Shenghen iA2 = 100·[ln yA2 - ln yA2(-1)] 
yB1 B-share investors' number – Shanghai iB1 = 100·[ln yB1 - ln yB1(-1)] 
yB2 B-share investors' number – Shenghen iB2 = 100·[ln yB2 - ln yB2(-1)] 
VA1 A-share trading volumes – Shanghai vA1 = 100·[ln VA1 - ln VA1(-1)] 
VA2 A-share trading volumes – Shenghen vA2 = 100·[ln VA2 - ln VA2(-1)] 
VB1 B-share trading volumes – Shanghai vB1 = 100·[ln VB1 - ln VB1(-1)] 
VB2 B-share trading volumes – Shenghen vB2 = 100·[ln VB2 - ln VB2(-1)] 
A1 A-share index returns – Shanghai rA1 = 100·[ln A1 - ln A1(-1)] 
A2 A-share index returns – Shenghen rA2 = 100·[ln A2 - ln A2(-1)] 
B1 B-share index returns – Shanghai rB1 = 100·[ln B1 - ln B1(-1)] 
B2 B-share index returns – Shenghen rB2 = 100·[ln B2 - ln B2(-1)] 
Exogenous variables (instruments) 
 A-share lagged investors' number – Shanghai iA1(-1), iA1(-2) 
 A-share lagged investors' number – Shenghen iA2(-1) 
 B-share lagged investors' number – Shanghai iB1(-1), iB1(-2) 
 B-share lagged investors' number – Shenghen iB2(-1), iB2(-2) 
 A-share lagged trading volumes – Shanghai vA1(-1) 
 A-share lagged trading volumes – Shenghen vA2(-1), vA2(-2) 
 B-share lagged trading volumes – Shanghai vB1(-1), vB1(-2) 
 B-share lagged trading volumes – Shenghen vB2(-1), vB2(-2), vB2(-3) 
WA1 A-share weighted average P/E ratio - Shanghai wA1 = 100·[ln WA1 - ln WA1(-1)] 
WA2 A-share weighted average P/E ratio – Shenghen wA2 = 100·[ln WA2 - ln WA2(-1)] 
WB1 B-share weighted average P/E ratio – Shanghai wB1 = 100·[ln WB1 - ln WB1(-1)] 
WB2 B-share weighted average P/E ratio - Shenghen wB2 = 100·[ln WB2 - ln WB2(-1)] 
MVA1 A-share market value - Shanghai cA1 = 100·[ln MVA1 - ln MVA1(-1)] 
- rA1 
MVA2 A-share market value – Shenghen cA2 = 100·[ln MVA2 - ln MVA2(-1)] 
- rA2 
MVB1 B-share market value – Shanghai cB1 = 100·[ln MVB1 - ln MVB1(-1)] 
- rB1 
MVB2 B-share market value – Shenghen cB2 = 100·[ln MVB2 - ln MVB2(-1)] 
- rB2 
RA1 A-share price index daily return - Shanghai σA1 = see equation (1) 
RA2 A-share price index daily return - Shenghen σA2 = see equation (1) 
RB1 B-share price index daily return - Shanghai σB1 = see equation (1) 
RB2 B-share price index daily return - Shenghen σB2 = see equation (1) 
SP S&P monthly composite index rSP = 100·[ln SP - ln SP(-1)]  
Source: DATASTREAM 
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Table 2: Regulatory dummy description 
Date Dummy Regulatory event 
1999:07 seclaw PRC Security Law 
2001:02 opchi Notice regarding B-share investment by chinese citizens 
2001:09 indir Guidelines for estabilishing independent directors for listed companies 
2002:01 cgov 
 
Code of corporate governance for listed companies,  
Delisting procedures became effective 
2002:12 qfii Qualified Foreign Istitutional Investors (QFII) scheme  
2003:12 ipospon Interim measures on the sponsor system for securities public offering 
2004:02 prodev Guidelines on promoting reform, opening-up and steady development of 
chinese capital market 
2004:12 intprot 
 
Rules of strengthening protection of private shareholders' rights and 
interests, 
Circular on several issues of the initial public offering book-building pricing 
system 
2005:05 ipores IPO procedures resumption,  
Extensible Business Report Language for information disclosure of listed 
companies 
 
Source: CSRC (2004, 2005 and 2006) 
 
The model consists of a standard system of simultaneous equations, whose 
structural form at time t is 
 
    ttt xyB εµ +Γ′+=′      (2) 
 
where yt is an n-dimensional vector including all the endogenous variables, xt is a 
k-dimensional vector with all the exogenous variables in which the dummy 
variables are included, εt ~ i.i.d.(0,Σ) is the vector of error terms and µ is the vector 
of constant terms. The matrices B’ and Γ’contain respectively (n × n) and (n × k) 
coefficients. In this model n = 12 and k = 32; thus, considering the triple (B, Γ, Σ) 
and the vector of constants µ, the total amount of parameters is n + n(n + k) + 
0.5n(n + 1) = 554. 
Hence, the main problem with this kind of model is the imposition of restrictions in 
order to achieve identification of the system. The solution is provided by two sets of 
constraints; on one hand, the financial markets and economic theory suggest the 
use of some exclusion constraints, thus some variables are restricted to be zero in 
some equations. On the other hand, the diagonal of the matrix B’ is imposed to be 
a n-dimensional vector of ones. This set of normalization restrictions is useful for 
expressing each element of yt as a function of the other endogenous variables and 
of all the exogenous variables. Finally, in our model cross-equations restrictions 
are not set and this allows us to estimate the model equation by equation. 
Given that 
 
yt = [ iA1  iA2  iB1  iB2  vA1  vA2  vB1  vB2  rA1  rA2  rB1  rB2 ]’, 
 
the system substantially consists of three blocks of four equations, taking markets 
A- and B-shares into account; in the first block the dependent variables are the 
changes in the number of stock investment accounts, in the second block the 
dependent variables are the variations in volumes and the third block is related to 
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returns. Tables 3, 4 and 5 show all the estimated equations in the system. From 
the structural form of equation (2), the identification process requires that both the 
order condition and the rank condition, should be satisfied; the first is a necessary, 
but generally not sufficient condition and it necessitates that in each equation the 
number of excluded explanatory variables should be at least as great as the 
number of the included endogenous variables. The rank condition is a sufficient 
condition for identification which takes the equation ΠB = Γ into account, where Π’ 
is taken from the reduced form of equation (2) 
 
    ttt uxMy +Π′+=      (3) 
 
where M = (B’)−1µ, Π = (B’)−1 Γ'and ut =(B’)−1εt. The rank condition is satisfied if the 
restrictions imposed upon the structural form allow one to express any condition in 
terms of both the parameters belonging to (B, Γ, Σ) and the parameters of the 
reduced form (Π, Ω), with  Ω= V ar(ut) and ut =(B’)−1εt  (see for example Davidson 
and MacKinnon, 1993). 
 
Given the great number of explanatory variables (or instruments), the order 
condition is very easy to test in our model, and the set of constraints imposed to 
the coefficients guarantees that the rank condition is also satisfied. 
 
Tables 3, 4 and 5 report the estimates of our system obtained using both the Two 
Stages Least Squares (2SLS) and the Three Stages Least Squares (3SLS) 
estimators. Some standard useful diagnostics, such as the Hausman specification 
test, the Sargan overidentifying restrictions test, the Godfrey test for autocorrelation 
and the normaliy test by Jarque-Bera tests, are computed. The degrees of freedom 
of the chi-squared test statistic are provided in parenthesis for the former two tests, 
while for the autocorrelation and the normality tests they are fixed to 3 and 2 
respectively(6). 
 
The 2SLS estimator was chosen for both theoretical and practical reasons. First of 
all, this estimator provides consistent and asymptotic normally distributed 
estimates and it is the most efficient instrumental variables equation-by-equation 
estimator given the assumption that the data generating process is a system of 
simultaneous equations (Sargan, 1988). Second, this method is not different from 
the instrumental variables equation-by equation estimation therefore, if an error of 
misspecification occurs in one equation, it does not affect the others. Moreover, 
each equation is not affected by the overidentifying restrictions of the other 
equations. The use of the 3SLS estimator especially depends upon practical 
reasons; even if this method improves efficiency under the assumption of a well 
specified system. Tables 3, 4 and 5 show that its results are very similar to those 
provided by 2SLS. Finally, 2SLS and 3SLS are closed-form estimators; hence they 
do not require any numerical algorithm to achieve convergence. 
 
In the literature regarding the systems of simultaneous equations, alternative 
estimation methods exist, such as the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood 
(LIML) or the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) methods. Even if these 
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estimators have the usual properties of the ML estimators(7), they do not have 
closed-form solutions, they strictly depend on the assumptions regarding the 
density function of εt, and they often fail to achieve convergence, especially for 
finite samples with a small number of observations. Moreover, the results from the 
Jarque-Bera test often show a rejection of the normality hypothesis and this 
supports this choice. 
 
4. Discussion of Findings 
 
Tables 3, 4 and 5 summarize the whole analysis, with the equation by equation 
estimates using both the 2SLS and 3SLS methods. The main statistical findings 
are: 
- the estimation output of 2SLS does not substantially differ from those of 3SLS. 
This enforces the evidence that our results do not substantially depend upon 
the estimation method; 
- in some cases endogeneity is relevant as pointed out by the Hausman test in 
which the null hypothesis is often rejected: this confirms that the use of the 
instrumental variables estimator is often required; 
- the Sargan test shows the validity of the instruments used. With a confidence 
level of 5% the only exception is given by equation 11, but the null hypothesis 
was not strongly rejected (the p-value is 0.0130); 
- the Godfrey test always accepted the null of incorrelated residuals(8); 
- the normality of residuals is often rejected and this supports the idea of 
avoiding estimation via ML estimators; 
- the Sargan test performed in the 3SLS estimation provided the following 
results: 
• Test statistic = 311.340 
• p-value = 0.0704 (critical value from a 2276χ  distribution). 
This confirms the validity of all the instruments used. 
 
4.1 Investors’ Number 
 
The following series of findings were identified as relevant from Table 3. 
 
Wave-effects: Chinese savers’ behaviour generates waves of stock account 
subscriptions, characterized by a yearly seasonality, as proved by our 
preliminarily tests. Moreover, imitative behaviour is relevant: the variations in 
stock account subscriptions were correlated between the two Stock Exchanges, 
and frequently between the two segments of shares (A and B). The stronger 
interconnections are relevant between the A-shares segments; A-share 
investors are influenced by B-share investors’ choices, while the opposite is 
less true. Nevertheless, the influence of emotional waves may also be 
confirmed for B-investors, given the positive effect of the S&P performances on 
the SZSE B shares investors’ number; 
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Investment memory: the waves of stock account subscriptions are generally 
related with their past, thus the amount of investments have a memory.  
Sometimes the overall effect indicates a reinforcing trend, along time, as in the 
case of iA1 and iB1. In other circumstances the past seems to be competing with 
the present (competing trend), when the lagged variables enter the current 
number of investors with some negative effect as in iA2; 
 
SHSE leadership: The estimates reveal that SHSE plays a leading role: the 
coefficient of iA2 in equation 1 is 0.3093, while the coefficient of iA1 in equation 2 
is greater (0.9687). For the B-shares segment, the number of investment 
accounts in SZSE is influenced by that of SHSE market. The opposite effect is 
not statistically relevant; 
 
Market enlargement effect: in equation 3 the number of B-share investors (iB1) is 
positively affected by the real market enlargement (the real market 
capitalisation growth, cB1), whereas it is negatively correlated with cB2; 
 
 
Table 3: Investors’ number 
 
 
Equation 1 – Dependent variable: iA1 
var. coeff. s.e. t-stat p-value coeff. s.e. t-stat p-value 
µ1 -0.4881 0.0556 -8.7768 0.0000*** -0.4471 0.0502 -8.8979 0.0000***
iA2 0.3093 0.0837 3.6952 0.0002*** 0.3854 0.0753 5.1212 0.0000***
iB1 0.0045 0.0024 1.9070 0.0565* 0.0046 0.0021 2.1300 0.0332** 
rA1 -0.0099 0.0044 -2.2356 0.0254** -0.0118 0.0040 -2.9320 0.0034***
iA1(−1) 0.1620 0.0559 2.8999 0.0037*** 0.1446 0.0479 3.0178 0.0026***
iA2(−1) 0.5673 0.0823 6.8972 0.0000*** 0.5206 0.0710 7.3349 0.0000***
rSP 0.0061 0.0067 0.9192 0.358 0.0018 0.0062 0.2833 0.777 
Hausman test (3) 7.0408 p-value 0.0706
Sargan test (26) 25.5065 p-value 0.4905
Godfrey test 3.7973 p-value 0.2842
Jarque-Bera test 1.4157 p-value 0.4927  
Equation 2 – Dependent variable: iA2 
var. coeff. s.e. t-stat p-value coeff. s.e. t-stat p-value 
µ2 0.1052 0.0798 1.3194 0.1870 0.1378 0.0712 1.9349 0.0530* 
iA1 0.9687 0.1020 9.4942 0.0000*** 1.0054 0.0914 10.9945 0.0000***
iB2 0.0065 0.0055 1.1852 0.2360 0.0072 0.0044 1.6321 0.1027 
rA2 0.0263 0.0054 4.9078 0.0000*** 0.0251 0.0050 5.0502 0.0000***
iA1(−1) -0.2870 0.1199 -2.3944 0.0167** -0.2980 0.1030 -2.8924 0.0038***
iA1(−2) 0.1850 0.0884 2.0928 0.0364** 0.1511 0.0705 2.1445 0.0320** 
iB2(−1) -0.0132 0.0050 -2.6302 0.0085*** -0.0122 0.0044 -2.7912 0.0053***
rSP 0.0075 0.0101 0.7385 0.4602 0.0073 0.0094 0.7779 0.4366 
ipores 0.6343 0.3555 1.7844 0.0744* 0.2927 0.2809 1.0418 0.2975 
Hausman test (3) 2.915 p-value 0.4049
Sargan test (24) 34.1913 p-value 0.0813
Godfrey test 3.7865 p-value 0.2855
Jarque-Bera test 17.077 p-value 0.0002  
Lucarelli & Palomba 
 
74
Equation 3  - Dependent variable: iB1 
var. coeff. s.e. t-stat p-value coeff. s.e. t-stat p-value 
µ3 -2.0807 0.3570 -5.8283 0.0000*** -2.1376 0.3238 -6.6006 0.0000***
iA1 0.4462 0.4952 0.9011 0.3676 0.3625 0.3988 0.9088 0.3635 
iB2 0.0384 0.0462 0.8312 0.4059 0.0363 0.0400 0.9066 0.3646 
rB1 -0.0186 0.0329 -0.5653 0.5718 -0.0122 0.0292 -0.4174 0.6764 
iB1(−1) 0.7368 0.2641 2.7899 0.0053*** 0.7886 0.2037 3.8720 0.0001***
iB1(−2) 0.1422 0.0492 2.8902 0.0039*** 0.1613 0.0379 4.2506 0.0000***
iB2(−1) 1.2114 0.0480 25.2375 0.0000*** 1.2352 0.0404 30.6073 0.0000***
iB2(−2) -1.1643 0.3736 -3.1164 0.0018*** -1.2632 0.2876 -4.3924 0.0000***
cB1 0.2818 0.0682 4.1320 0.0000*** 0.2911 0.0560 5.1938 0.0000***
cB2 -0.3994 0.0698 -5.7221 0.0000*** -0.4047 0.0577 -7.0103 0.0000***
rSP 0.0195 0.0844 0.2310 0.8175 0.0185 0.0715 0.2583 0.7962 
Hausman test (3) 14.8321 p-value 0.0020
Sargan test (24) 29.5478 p-value 0.1299
Godfrey test 4.1573 p-value 0.2450
Jarque-Bera test 31.8051 p-value 0.0000  
Equation 4 – Dependent variable: iB2 
var. coeff. s.e. t-stat p-value coeff. s.e. t-stat p-value 
µ4 -0.5254 0.2594 -2.0254 0.0428** -0.5404 0.2485 -2.1752 0.0296** 
iA2 0.0941 0.3567 0.2638 0.7920 0.0864 0.3462 0.2495 0.8030 
iB1 0.3393 0.0311 10.9257 0.0000*** 0.345 0.0287 12.037 0.0000***
rB2 -0.0087 0.0221 -0.3939 0.6937 -0.011 0.0207 -0.5303 0.5959 
rSP 0.1597 0.0668 2.3909 0.0168** 0.1820 0.0623 2.9238 0.0035***
opchi 65.0968 2.4536 26.5311 0.0000*** 64.7772 2.2598 28.6654 0.0000***
prodev -8.6561 2.4192 -3.5781 0.0004*** -6.9397 2.0869 -3.3254 0.0009***
Hausman test (3) 5.6615 p-value 0.1293    
Sargan test (26) 20.8647 p-value 0.7489    
Godfrey test 1.5023 p-value 0.6817     
Jarque-Bera test 66.132 p-value 0.0000     
 2SLS Estimation 3SLS Estimation 
 
 
Ambiguous returns influence: The relationship between the investors’ number and 
the stock market return is ambiguous for iA1, while for B-shares this is not 
relevant. On the SZSE a significant and positive relationship of rA2 to iA2 reveals 
a traditional link of market performances to stock investments. To the contrary, 
the significant and negative relationship of iA1 with rA1 may appear surprising, 
but also fascinating: this may represent a sort of anti-cyclical behaviour of the 
Chinese savers. In fact, an increase (decrease) in stock investment accounts 
should be related to a prudential (opportunistic) reaction to the stock index 
decrease (increase). Nevertheless, this induces the suspicion that investors’ 
behaviour is affected by irrationality of Chinese savers, pulled towards, or 
against, the stock exchange investment by a set of reasons, barely explained 
by the stock market fundamentals. We can refer to emotional or imitative 
behaviour, but we may also figure out the presence of a compulsory need for 
savings allocation. 
 
Lucarelli & Palomba 
 
75
Regulatory insensitivity and untrustworthiness: we use all the nine regulatory 
dummies of Table 2 in a preliminary OLS setting (9) and find out that five of 
them (indir, cgov, qfii, ipospon and intprot) do not have any effect at all. So they 
have been used, tested and then rejected from our model, while the remaining 
four regulatory dummies do play some role in our system. As far as the 
investors’ number is concerned, we notice the absence of statistical relevance 
for all the regulatory dummies on the Shanghai A-share investors’ number. This 
should mean that the series of regulatory acts, during the observed period, do 
not affect the investment choices of Chinese savers, especially in the mainland 
leader Stock Exchange. In the SZSE only the public offering resumption of May 
2005 (ipores) has any kind of effect. The B segment is obviously positively 
affected by the opchi dummy, which represents the act that allowed the 
Chinese savers to invest in the B-share market that is generally reserved for 
foreigners. Nevertheless, the dicotomical variable prodev, referring to a 
measure addressed to develop and open up the Chinese Stock Exchanges, is 
relevant but negatively affects the SZSE B-share investors’ number: this may 
represent a clear signal of the weak trustworthiness of the investors operating 
in China, which arises when new legal measures regarding the financial market 
soundness are issued. 
 
 
4.2 Trading Volumes 
 
Table 4, regarding trading volumes, confirms the previous findings: wave-effects 
and imitative behaviours, investment memory and a general regulatory 
insensitivity. Only the opchi dummy positively affects the trading activity but with 
reference only to the SZSE A-market segment. 
 
Democratisation strengths are significant for the SHSE A-market. We refer to the 
negative relationship between the stock trading volumes (vA1) and the number 
of stock investment accounts (iA1). This could mean that the larger the stock 
investment basis is in the SHSE, the lower the average trading activity is. This 
suggests that a large number of new investors may not feel comfortable with 
stock trading. When the investors’ basis increases, the probability of having 
smaller shareholders negotiating lower quantity of stocks (or not to negotiate at 
all) augments. Nevertheless, this relationship is not relevant for the other 
markets; 
 
Emotional trends, are revealed by the relationship of vA2 and vB1 with the 
performances of the S&P monthly return. This is particularly strange if we keep 
in mind that A-share investors are mainly Chinese and they are not allowed to 
invest abroad. Therefore, this connection may reflect an emotional or an 
irrational influence upon the Chinese stock trading activity, as carried out by 
international stock markets trends; 
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Table 4: Trading volumes 
 
 
Equation 5 – Dependent variable: vA1 
var. coeff. s.e. t-stat p-value coeff. s.e. t-stat p-value 
µ5 3.7160 3.5693 1.0411 0.2978 3.2188 3.3168 0.9704 0.3318 
iA1 -7.8941 3.1064 -2.5413 0.0110** -6.7909 2.8875 -2.3518 0.0187** 
vA2 0.2530 0.0831 3.0438 0.0023*** 0.3141 0.0765 4.1053 0.0000***
vB1 0.2201 0.0566 3.8866 0.0001*** 0.1811 0.0511 3.5443 0.0004***
rA1 0.9024 0.5169 1.7458 0.0809* 0.9819 0.4741 2.0713 0.0383** 
vA1(−1) -0.0893 0.0538 -1.6610 0.0967* -0.1154 0.0489 -2.3614 0.0182** 
wA1 0.7500 0.4143 1.8100 0.0703* 0.6877 0.3644 1.8875 0.0591* 
σA1 -0.8279 1.546 -0.5355 0.5923 -0.6671 1.4122 -0.4724 0.6367 
rSP 0.9895 0.6444 1.5355 0.1247 0.6896 0.6066 1.1368 0.2556 
Hausman test (4) 8.026 p-value 0.0906
Sargan test (24) 31.8245 p-value 0.1314
Godfrey test 4.3448 p-value 0.2266
Jarque-Bera test 1.7542 p-value 0.4160  
Equation 6 – Dependent variable: vA2 
var. coeff. s.e. t-stat p-value coeff. s.e. t-stat p-value 
µ6 -6.6036 4.0996 -1.6108 0.1072 -5.5724 3.6395 -1.5311 0.1258 
iA2 -4.3024 4.1943 -1.0258 0.3050 -4.0766 3.7797 -1.0785 0.2808 
vA1 0.9106 0.1353 6.7324 0.0000*** 1.0368 0.1138 9.1110 0.0000***
rA2 0.3163 0.6053 0.5226 0.6012 -0.0521 0.5112 -0.1018 0.9189 
vA2(−1) 0.0471 0.0596 0.7898 0.4296 0.0920 0.0506 1.8197 0.0688* 
wA2 0.1713 0.5713 0.2999 0.7643 0.0604 0.4647 0.1299 0.8966 
σA2 2.9005 1.5749 1.8416 0.0655* 2.2586 1.3199 1.7111 0.0871* 
rSP 1.5913 0.7532 2.1127 0.0346** 1.7017 0.6714 2.5346 0.0113** 
opchi 222.153 30.0404 7.3951 0.0000*** 204.531 25.8582 7.9097 0.0000***
Hausman test (3) 1.5802 p-value 0.6639
Sargan test (24) 22.6472 p-value 0.5407
Godfrey test 0.8888 p-value 0.8281
Jarque-Bera test 254.965 p-value 0.0000  
Equation 7 – Dependent variable: vB1 
var. coeff. s.e. t-stat p-value coeff. s.e. t-stat p-value 
µ7 -0.0697 3.5622 -0.0196 0.9844 0.1468 3.21 0.0457 0.9635 
iB1 -0.1702 0.3442 -0.4944 0.6210 -0.1156 0.2796 -0.4134 0.6793 
vB2 0.6139 0.0924 6.6416 0.0000*** 0.738 0.0735 10.0472 0.0000***
vA1 0.1224 0.1494 0.8195 0.4125 0.1121 0.1157 0.9694 0.3324 
rB1 0.4440 0.3631 1.2228 0.2214 0.1372 0.3062 0.4482 0.654 
vB1(−1) -0.0180 0.0430 -0.4187 0.6754 0.0012 0.0355 0.0324 0.9742 
vB1(−2) -0.1342 0.0461 -2.9113 0.0036*** -0.0687 0.0379 -1.8144 0.0696* 
wB1 0.7145 0.2866 2.4934 0.0127** 0.4320 0.2377 1.8174 0.0692* 
σB1 0.0842 0.5492 0.1533 0.8782 0.1119 0.4673 0.2394 0.8108 
rSP 1.3706 0.779 1.7595 0.0785* 0.8049 0.6907 1.1653 0.2439 
Hausman test (4) 12.5018 p-value 0.0140
Sargan test (23) 14.7022 p-value 0.9050
Godfrey test 3.7371 p-value 0.2913
Jarque-Bera test 0.1923 p-value 0.9083  
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Equation 8 – Dependent variable: vB2 
var. coeff. s.e. t-stat p-value coeff. s.e. t-stat p-value 
µ8 0.2206 3.3873 0.0651 0.9481 0.175 3.0375 0.0576 0.9541 
iB2 -0.4415 0.3238 -1.3634 0.1728 -0.1205 0.2634 -0.4574 0.6474 
vB1 0.7744 0.1022 7.5806 0.0000*** 0.8756 0.0788 11.1092 0.0000***
rB2 0.9135 0.3796 2.4062 0.0161** 0.5694 0.3150 1.8077 0.0707* 
vB2(−1) -0.1245 0.0369 -3.3705 0.0008*** -0.1282 0.0306 -4.1951 0.0000***
vB2(−2) -0.0779 0.0434 -1.7940 0.0728* -0.0397 0.0346 -1.1484 0.2508 
vB2(−3) -0.0665 0.0307 -1.7985 0.0721* -0.0575 0.0270 -2.1296 0.0332** 
wB2 0.3653 0.3054 1.1960 0.2317 0.2277 0.2447 0.9303 0.3522 
σB2 -0.2756 0.4973 -0.5541 0.5795 -0.2968 0.4189 -0.7084 0.4787 
rSP 0.0282 0.7194 0.0392 0.9687 -0.3378 0.6376 -0.5298 0.5962 
Hausman test (3) 1.8960 p-value 0.5943
Sargan test (23) 28.3574 p-value 0.2026
Godfrey test 7.9266 p-value 0.0476
Jarque-Bera test 0.9556 p-value 0.6202  
 2SLS Estimation 3SLS Estimation 
 
 
Risk drivers: the trading volumes of the leader market (SHSE) are positively 
affected by the weighted average price/earning (P/E) ratios (variables wA1 and 
wB1). This should mean that the more, on average, the Chinese stocks are 
overvalued (high P/E ratio), the more frenetic the market activities become. As 
a consequence, this should reveal the presence of speculative bubble risks, 
which will be confirmed by the stock index estimations. The variance σA2, a 
traditional measure of market risk, seems to play some role only in equation 6. 
 
 
4.3 Stock Index Returns 
 
Table 5 contains the estimation of the equations referred to stock index returns 
foundations, from which we notice the following findings. 
 
Table 5: Stock index returns 
 
Equation 9 – Dependent variable: rA1 
var. coeff. s.e. t-stat p-value coeff. s.e. t-stat p-value 
µ9 0.7278 0.2628 2.7689 0.0056*** 0.7298 0.2415 3.0212 0.0025***
rA2 0.6081 0.0808 7.5240 0.0000*** 0.6288 0.0717 8.7702 0.0000***
iA1 0.1386 0.1861 0.7446 0.4565 0.0923 0.1743 0.5294 0.5965
wA1 0.0734 0.0283 2.5906 0.0096*** 0.0606 0.0259 2.3402 0.0193** 
wA2 0.1983 0.0696 2.8505 0.0044*** 0.1919 0.0617 3.1109 0.0019***
cA1 -0.2545 0.0815 -3.1221 0.0018*** -0.2370 0.0718 -3.3029 0.0010***
σA1 -0.1323 0.0946 -1.3993 0.1617 -0.1521 0.0869 -1.7501 0.0801* 
Hausman test (2) 3.0817 p-value 0.2142
Sargan test (26) 32.3501 p-value 0.1818
Godfrey test 2.4119 p-value 0.4914
Jarque-Bera test 0.0600 p-value 0.9704  
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Equation 10 – Dependent variable: rA2 
var. coeff. s.e. t-stat p-value coeff. s.e. t-stat p-value 
µ10 0.3138 0.2734 1.1474 0.2512 0.2336 0.2432 0.9607 0.3367 
rA1 0.6178 0.1144 5.3981 0.0000*** 0.7152 0.0956 7.4823 0.0000***
iA2 0.2638 0.2343 1.1259 0.2602 0.1931 0.2156 0.8959 0.3703 
wA1 0.0526 0.0363 1.4487 0.1474 0.0337 0.0312 1.0815 0.2795 
wA2 0.3533 0.0770 4.5872 0.0000*** 0.2976 0.0644 4.6226 0.0000***
cA2 -0.4268 0.0891 -4.7890 0.0000*** -0.3622 0.0739 -4.9037 0.0000***
σA2 0.0522 0.0949 0.5502 0.5822 0.0526 0.0818 0.6430 0.5202 
Hausman test (2) 7.6171 p-value 0.0222
Sargan test (26) 21.4724 p-value 0.7172
Godfrey test 3.0309 p-value 0.3869
Jarque-Bera test 9.9551 p-value 0.0069  
Equation 11 – Dependent variable: rB1 
var. coeff. s.e. t-stat p-value coeff. s.e. t-stat p-value 
µ11 1.0318 0.7175 1.4379 0.1505 1.1871 0.5901 2.0117 0.0443** 
rB2 0.1780 0.0747 2.3811 0.0173** 0.1612 0.0605 2.6638 0.0077***
iB1 -0.0903 0.0492 -1.8348 0.0665* -0.0868 0.0397 -2.1891 0.0286** 
iB1(−1) 0.0956 0.0309 3.0934 0.0020*** 0.1110 0.0242 4.5838 0.0000***
iB1(−2) 0.1172 0.0267 4.3896 0.0000*** 0.1135 0.0209 5.4397 0.0000***
iA1 2.3359 0.9246 2.5264 0.0115** 2.6896 0.7569 3.5532 0.0004***
iA1(−1) -2.1276 0.8615 -2.4696 0.0135** -2.4512 0.6897 -3.5541 0.0004***
wA2 0.1257 0.0556 2.2589 0.0239** 0.1464 0.0461 3.1737 0.0015***
wB1 0.6320 0.0458 13.8046 0.0000*** 0.6157 0.0364 16.8984 0.0000***
wB2 0.0771 0.0624 1.2340 0.2172 0.0847 0.0494 1.7157 0.0862* 
cB1 -0.9283 0.0751 -12.3661 0.0000*** -0.9431 0.0610 -15.4499 0.0000***
σB1 0.0447 0.0610 0.7324 0.4639 0.0682 0.0492 1.3867 0.1655 
opchi 4.6790 2.8745 1.6278 0.1036 4.1757 2.3198 1.8000 0.0719* 
ipores 15.1742 3.0904 4.9101 0.0000*** 12.9739 2.4769 5.2380 0.0000***
seclaw -9.0954 3.2810 -2.7721 0.0056*** -9.2950 2.5678 -3.6198 0.0003***
Hausman test (3) 4.4005 p-value 0.2213
Sargan test (18) 33.9015 p-value 0.0130
Godfrey test 0.8598 p-value 0.8351
Jarque-Bera test 15.8786 p-value 0.0004  
Equation 12 – Dependent variable: rB2 
var. coeff. s.e. t-stat p-value coeff. s.e. t-stat p-value 
µ12 0.6031 0.6673 0.9038 0.3661 0.6516 0.6074 1.0727 0.2834 
rB1 0.1906 0.1006 1.8938 0.0583* 0.1504 0.0870 1.7292 0.0838* 
iB2 0.0349 0.0636 0.5486 0.5833 0.0212 0.0572 0.3712 0.7105 
wB1 0.0823 0.0824 0.9987 0.3179 0.0719 0.0684 1.0501 0.2937 
wB2 0.6483 0.0553 11.7205 0.0000*** 0.6747 0.0467 14.4430 0.0000***
cB2 -0.7484 0.1029 -7.2720 0.0000*** -0.7838 0.0886 -8.8463 0.0000***
σB2 0.0427 0.0961 0.4445 0.6567 0.0462 0.0807 0.5726 0.5669 
Hausman test (2) 15.0410 p-value 0.0005
Sargan test (26) 36.0015 p-value 0.0916
Godfrey test 4.1192 p-value 0.2489
Jarque-Bera test 99.9449 p-value 0.0000  
 2SLS Estimation 3SLS Estimation 
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Market correlations: there is a positive estimated correlation between the returns of 
the same kind of share and all these correlations are statistically relevant; 
 
IPOs distrust: the primary market structure could play a role in explaining the trend 
of the Chinese Stock Exchanges. Since the beginning, Chinese authorities 
chose to find their stock market growth through external expansion that means 
the issue of new shares, such as Initial Public Offering (IPOs), secondary 
placements (SPs) and follow-up offerings. On the contrary, the internal 
expansion, followed by many western stock exchanges, would have slowed 
down the breath of the stock markets in favour of the appreciation of existing 
stocks. The external growth of stock markets introduces a problem: further bids 
of capital could cause a sort of “dilution effect”, making the existing stock prices 
suffer. This is reasonable if either the IPOs or SPs are competing for limited 
capital, or if investors distrust their quality. If the new offers are economically 
attractive and flows of capital are not limited, the external growth of the 
Exchanges can easily co-exist with a steady uptrend of their performances. In 
China, funds streaming towards stock markets cannot be imagined as limited. 
So, the significant and negative relationship between all the four return 
indicators (rA1, rA2, rB1 and rB2) with their respectively net market values (cA1, cA2, 
cB1 and cB2) may only be explained by a general disbelief in the fundamental 
attractiveness of the new listings; 
 
Risk drivers are provided by a remarkable relationship between all the four stock 
indexes and the relative P/E indicators. The market performances, as well as 
the trading volumes, seem to be strongly driven by the over evaluation (high 
P/E ratios) of listed shares. This may depend upon emotional and speculative 
behaviours. Instead, the traditional risk-return relationship between the variance 
σi,j and the stock index performance is not relevant;  
 
Changing attitudes towards regulation: the regulatory insensitivity of A-share 
investors has been systematically confirmed in all of our estimations. 
Nevertheless, in equation 11 seclaw and ipores dummies cause two opposite 
effects: the former, related to the first regulatory act, is a decreasing level of 
trust in the market. The latter, on the other hand, refers to the more recent 
regulatory act considered in our analysis and its contribution is strong and 
positive. This may indicate a sign of a change in the attitude towards the 
regulative activity. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks and Further Research 
 
Through estimating a system of simultaneous equations, we find that the overall 
Chinese savers’ attitude towards stock investment is affected by emotional and 
speculative behaviour, especially for the A-share segment of the market. Waves of 
new stock investment accounts are interconnected between the two Stock 
Exchanges and somehow also between A- and B-segments of the market, with a 
feeble (or unexpected) relationship with the stock market performances. This may 
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be coherent with behavioural finance conceptual findings (see for example Thaler 
and Barberis, 2003), and also with the abundance of savings looking for 
remunerative investment alternatives. The more imitative and “emotionally” driven 
market side is the A-share market. A more dominant role of the SHSE has also 
been identified, compared to the SZSE which acts as a follower. 
 
Estimates referring to the trading volumes confirm emotional or imitative and 
speculative behaviour and risk driven market activities. In particular, the relevance 
of the average price/earning ratios in sustaining the trading activity may also 
suggest the presence of a speculative bubble. These emotional strengths are 
confirmed as being more evident for the A-share segment of the market, whose 
trading volumes paradoxically also react to the S&P performances. 
 
Stock index returns are strongly correlated and negatively affected by the stock 
market enlargement, indeed we refer to a sort of IPOs distrust. Emotional-
speculative strengths are also evident, given the relevance of the P/E ratio in 
sustaining stock index returns. 
The final remarkable result is related to the relevance of the regulatory dummies. 
Our findings suggest that savers’ attitude towards stock investment, trading 
volumes and market returns are seldom affected by changes in the Chinese legal 
framework. The regulatory insensitivity of A-share investors (typically Chinese) has 
been systematically confirmed for the Chinese leader Stock Exchange (SHSE). A 
sporadic effect displayed by some dummies shows the widespread distrust of 
investors towards the Chinese financial legal system and this is particularly 
relevant for the initial regulation of 1999. Finally, signals of better attitudes towards 
the more recent legal acts are shown. 
 
A possible extension of this work would be to carry out a cointegration analysis to 
enhance the system of equation (2): in particular taking into account the long run 
relationships between the endogenous variables. If any cointegration vector exists, 
we could also use some linear combination as an instrument in our analysis. 
 
 
 
Endnotes 
 
 (1) See Weber (2004) and CSRC (2003, 2004 and 2005). 
(2) See King and Levine (1993), Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1996), Levine (1996), Beck et al. 
(2000), Levine and Loayza (2000), Baier et al. (2003). 
(3) See Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) and La Porta et al. 
(2000). 
(4) See Allen et al. (2005) and Lin (2004). 
(5) For example, on August 16th 2001, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
promulgated the “Guidelines for Establishing Independent Directors of Listed Companies” to 
provide guidance concerning the independent directors in listed companies. On January 7th 2002, 
the CSRC and the State Economic and Trade Commission jointly issued the “Code of Corporate 
Governance for Listed Companies” which outlines the fundamental principles of corporate 
governance for listed companies. These principles ensure a basic level of investor protection, as 
well as codes of conduct and ethical standards for managers of listed companies (CSRC, 2004). 
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(6) For all the equations of the system, the Godfrey test is always performed with 3 lags. For a 
detailed review of these tests see for example Davidson and MacKinnon (1993). 
(7) We mean consistency, asymptotic normality and invariance to monotonic transformations. 
(8) The only exception is equation 6, but the p-value of 0.0476 highlights that the rejection of the null 
hypothesis is weak. 
(9) To find out if the dummy variables have any effects upon the system’s endogenous variable, we 
carried out a preliminary analysis based upon the estimation of the reduced form of the system (2) 
given by equation (3). The estimation simply consists of n OLS regressions in which the dummy 
variables of Table 2 belong to the vector xt  containing all the regressors. 
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